A guide to onboard checkout.  Volume 6:  Structures/mechanics by unknown
An Engineering Study of
Onboard Checkout Techniques
A GUIDE TO ONBOARD CHECKOUT
VOLUME VI: STRUCTURES/MECHANICAL
Huntsville - - AIs ZS
O/ -1~-2,'
N72-1385
Unclas
10761 
I 
7 A7 (NASA-CR-115255)- A GUIDE TO ONBOARD.
CHECKOUT. VOLUME 6: STRUCTURES/MECHANICS
(International Business Machines Corp.)
Sep. 1971. 61 p CSCL 22B
U (NASA CR OR TMX OR AD NUMBER) (CATEGQOK T 
OPEN
OFFICE OF PRIME RESPONSIBILITY
' Redu 
Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U S Department of Commerce
Springfield VA 22151===
I
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19720006208 2020-03-23T14:56:43+00:00Z
An Engineering Study of
Onboard Checkout Techniques
A GUIDE TO ONBOARD CHECKOUT
VOLUME VI: STRUCTURES/MECHANICAL
IBM NUMBER: 71W-00313
SEPTEMBER 1971
Prepared for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas 77058
CONTRACT NUMBER NAS9-11189
2:3 Federal Systems Division, Electronics Systems Center/Huntsville, Alabama
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section
FOREW ORD ..................................
INTRODUCTION ...............................
1.1 OBJECTIVE .
1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY 
1.2.1 Study Objective ....................
1. 2. 2 Study Baseline ....................
1. 2. 3 Study Tasks ......................
1. 2.4 Previous Reports ...................
2 BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION ................
2.1 GENERAL . .............................
2.2 SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION ................
2. 2.1 Basic Structure ....................
2. 2. 2 Docking Mechanism .................
2. 2. 3 Access Hatches, Airlocks, View Ports ....
2. 2. 4 Antenna Deployment Mechanism .........
2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS .............
3 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES .
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ....................
3. 1. 1 Criticality Analysis Procedure .........
3.1. 2 Subsystem Criticality Data ............
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS ................
3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS ...........
3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS ..........
Page
v
1-1
1-1
1-2
1-2
1-2
1-2
1-3
2-1
2-1
2-1
2-2
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-4
3-1
3-1
3-1
3-2
3-2
3-6
3-6
~-'tv<*;s ri:~z 3j NOTi FviLliDn
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Page
4 CHECKOUT STRATEGIES ......................... 4-1
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY ........... 4-1
4.1.1 Space Station Subsystems ............. 4-2
4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY ........... 4-4
4.2.1 Integrated Checkout Strategy .......... 4-4
5 ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS ............ 5-1
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS ............... 5-1
5.1.1 Status Monitoring .................. 5-3
5. 1.2 Trend Analysis ................... 5-3
5.1.3 Periodic Checkout and Calibration ....... 5-3
5.1. 4 Fault Isolation .................... 5-4
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION .............. 5-4
6 SOFTWARE .................................. 6-1
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ................. 6-1
6.2 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEM ................ 6-3
6. 2. 1 System Requirements ................ 6-5
6. 2. 2 Operational Requirements ............ 6-8
6. 2. 3 Interface Requirements .............. 6-17
7 MAINTENANCE ............................... 7-1
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS ... ..... 7-1
7.1.1 General Space Station Maintenance Policy . . 7-1
7. 1. 2 Onboard Maintenance Facility Concepts .... 7-2
7. 1. 3 Subsystem Maintenance Concepts ....... 7-2
7. 2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE
(STUDY TASK 3) ........................... 7-3
7. 2.1 Maintenance Cycle .................. 7-4
7. 2. 2 Summary of Results ................ 7-4
iv
FOR EWORD
This is one of a set of seven reports, each one describing the
results, for a particular subsystem, of a study titled "An Engineering
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
With the advent of large scale aerospace systems, designers have recognized
the importance of specifying and meeting design requirements additional to the
classical functional and environmental requirements. These "additional" require-
ments include producibility, safety, reliability, quality, and maintainability.
These criteria have been identified, grown into prominence, and become disciplines
in their own right. Presently, it is inconceivable that any aerospace system/
equipment design requirements would be formulated without consideration of
these criteria.
The complexity, sophistication and duration of future manned space missions
demand that still another criterion needs to be considered in the formulation of
system/equipment requirements. The concept of "checkoutability" denotes the
adaptability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to a controlled checkout pro-
cess. As with other requirements, it should also apply from the time of early
design concept formulation.
The results of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" and
other studies indicate that for an extended space mission onboard checkout is
mandatory and applicable to all subsystems of the space system. In order to use
it effectively, "checkoutability" should be incorporated into the design of each
subsystem, beginning with initial performance requirements.
Conferences with researchers, system engineers and subsystem specialists
in the course of the basic Onboard Checkout Techniques Study revealed an extensive
interest in the idea of autonomous onboard checkout. Designers are motivated to
incorporate "checkoutability" into their subsystem designs but express a need for
information and guidance that will enable them to do so efficiently.
It is the objective of this report to present the results of the basic study as
they relate to one space subsystem to serve as a guide, by example, to those who
in the future need to implement onboard checkout in a similar subsystem. It is not
practicable to formulate a firm set of instructions or recipes, because operational
requirements, which vary widely among systems, normally determine the check-
out philosophy. It is suggested that the reader study this report as a basis from
which to build his own approach to "checkoutability. "
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1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY
1.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVE
The basic study was aimed at identification and evaluation of techniques for
achieving the following capabilities in the operational Space Station/Base, under
control of the Data Management System (DMS), with minimal crew intervention.
· Automated failure prediction and detection
* Automated fault isolation
* Failure correction
* Onboard electronic maintenance
1.2.2 STUDY BASELINE
The study started in July 1970. The system design baseline was established
by the Space Station Phase B study results as achieved by the McDonnell-Douglas/
IBM team, modified in accordance with technical direction from NASA-MSC. The
overall system configuration was the 33-foot diameter, four-deck, 12-man station.
Individual subsystem baseline descriptions are given in their respective "Guide to
Onboard Checkout" reports.
1.2. 3 STUDY TASKS
The basic study comprised five tasks. Primary emphasis was given to
Task 1, Requirements Analysis and Concepts. This task established subsystem
baseline descriptions and then analyzed them to determine their reliability/main-
tainability characteristics (criticality, failure modes and effects, maintenance
concepts and line replaceable unit (LRU) definitions), checkout strategies, test
definitions, and definitions of stimuli and measurements. After software pre-
liminary designs were available, an analysis of checkout requirements on the DMS
was performed.
A software task was performed to determine the software requirements
dictated by the results of Task 1.
Task 3 was a study of onboard electronic maintenance requirements and
recommendations of concepts to satisfy them. Supporting research and technology
tasks leading to an onboard maintenance capability were identified. The study
implementation plan and recommendations for implementing results of the study
were developed in Task 4. The task final report also summarizes results of the
study in all technical tasks.
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Reliability, Task 5, was very limited in scope, resulting in an analysis of
failure modes and effects in three Space Station subsystems, GN&C, DMS (computer
group) and RF communications.
1.2.4 PREVIOUS REPORTS
Results of the basic study were reported by task in the following reports,
under the general title of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques,
Final Report. "
IBM Number Title
71W-00111
71W-00112
71W-00113
71W-00114
71W-00115
Task 1:
Task 2:
Task 3:
Task 4:
Task 5:
Requirements Analysis and Concepts
Software
Onboard Maintenance
Summary and Recommendations
Subsystem Level Failure Modes and
Effects
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Section 2
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 GENERAL
This section describes the baseline Structures and Mechanical Subsystem
which was analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements. In order to assess
requirements for onboard checkout, descriptions at the subsystem level and the
assembly level are required, as well as the major interfaces between subsystems.
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL-160,
Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analysis. To
reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by reference into
this report, where applicable. Therefore, where no significant differences exist
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level
descriptions for that subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, the sub-
system level description includes these changes in as much detail as is available.
MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major subsystem interface descrip-
tions for analysis of integrated test requirements.
2.2 SYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION
The Space Station structure consists primarily of four subsystem areas
which will require checkout support. They are:
· Basic Structure
* Docking Mechanisms
* Spacecraft Access
- Hatches
- Airlocks
- View Ports
* Antenna Deployment Mechanisms
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2. 2. 1 BASIC STRUCTURE
The basic Space Station structure provides the necessary pressurized habitat,
equipment support, meteoroid protection, radiators, insulation, and docking inter-
faces. Attainment of the required volume for the accommodation of crew, experi-
ments, and subsystems within a 110, 000-pound weight limit demands that the
structure design be optimized. The structure must also have adequate factors of
safety to satisfy the long life (ten years) requirements. The design uses state-of-
the-art materials, design, and fabrication techniques.
The external cylindrical pressure shell and the center tunnel structure are
2219 aluminum alloy with integrally machined waffle stiffeners on the external
shell and integral stabilizing rings on the tunnel. Each two-deck module is closed
at each end with a toroidal dome membrane. The equipment in each module is
supported by the deck structure located halfway between the domes. The deck is
formed by a radial array of beams extending from the center tunnel to the external
pressure shell. The thrust loads in the center tunnel structure are carried to the
external pressure shell structure through a conic structure at the forward end of
the station.
ECS radiator, thermal insulation, meteoroid protection, and a pressure
shell are integrated into a 4. 5 inch thick sandwich design. The external surface
of 0. 020-inch beaded aluminum sheet serves the dual function of being both the
primary meteoroid bumper and the radiating surface for the ECS radiator. An
inner, 0. 010-inch corrugated aluminum sheet provides additional meteoroid pro-
tection and limits insulation blanket damage over the 10-year life. The two
bumpers are supported by 1 section aluminum extrusions which contain dual pas-
sages for the ECS radiator fluid. The 0. 110-inch, waffle stiffened pressure shell
forms the interior surface of the sandwich. Tests of this design at the MDAC
light gas gun facility have indicated that the no meteoroid puncture probability of
the pressure shell is 0. 985 for ten years.
2.2.2 DOCKING MECHANISM
The docking mechanism accomplishes the physical alignment of the vehicles,
attenuates the relative closing velocities, and captures and rigidizes the two ve-
hicles. In addition to the mating of the two vehicles, the system must accomplish
the disconnection, detachment, and separation of the spacecraft from the Space
Station.
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The conceptual design prepared for the docking mechanism and shock ab-
sorber/actuator is described as follows. A gas spring is used for energy absorp-
tion so that the pressure can be varied to accommodate wide variations in the
masses of the vehicles to be docked. A floating piston separates the gas from a
low temperature hydraulic fluid. As the shock absorber strokes, the hydraulic
fluid flows through a one-way valve and drives the floating piston down the shock
absorber, doing work against the gas pressure. When the compression stroke is
completed, the one-way valve prevents the shock absorber from springing back.
A small bypass orifice permits it to return at a slow, controlled rate to its initial
extended length. The gas spring pressure can then be reduced for retracting the
frame to the stowed position.
2.2.3 ACCESS HATCHES, AIRLOCKS, VIEW PORTS
In the evolution of the Space Station configuration, the requirement for crew
access to the various compartments, docked modules, external portions of the
station, and consideration of redundant transfer paths in case of emergencies is
essential for crew safety considerations. While normal crew activities and access
to experiment and cargo modules will be accomplished in a shirtsleeve environ-
ment, some contingency operations will require pressure suit and airlock transfer
capabilities.
The requirement for two separately pressurized volumes has been provided
by the two-deck, common module design approach; in addition, the 10-foot-di-
ameter center tunnel provides a third pressure volume. The expendables com-
partment is normally unpressurized except for shirtsleeve access for maintenance
and repair. The forward portion of the center tunnel can be used as an airlock if
necessary.
Each deck will have a 5-foot-diameter clear opening access hatch into the
tunnel. These hatches will be open for the normal traffic flow, but, in cases of
emergency, may be closed and sealed against fire, contamination, or depressur-
ization in one of the common modules. If one of the common modules is depres-
surized, the tunnel environment will be referenced to the other common module
environmental control system. Using pressure suits, the crew may then reenter
the depressurized module for inspection and repair through the fixed airlock.
This airlock will also permit access to the outside of the Space Station from either
of the common modules for normal EVA activities.
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2.2.4 ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
The Space Station requires four 15-foot diameter communications antennas
to provide high-gain RF acquisition and continuous tracking of relay satellites.
These antennas are stowed during launch under the nose fairing together with the
artificial-g telescoping spoke. Upon reaching orbit and ejection of fairings, the
antenna mounting booms shall be extended and locked in operating position until
artificial gravity operation. The antenna mounting boom requires the capability
of being retracted and locked in a low inertia position during the artificial gravity
mode. The antenna shall have a two-axis gimbal positioner located at the antenna
end of the mounting boom. The azimuth axis shall be parallel to the Space Station
Z axis. Each antenna shall be capable of scanning 360 degrees in azimuth and
from +75 degrees to -10 degrees in elevation. During maintenance, the antennas
shall be retracted to air lock ports where the back side of the antenna is accessible
to intervehicular astronauts. The antenna locations shall be 45 degrees off the
major Y-Z axes. The antenna masts are fixed length and actuated by an electric
motor drive train located at the hinge line. Flexible power and signal leads must
be provided at the hinge to provide power to the antenna drive and to transmit
position signals. In addition, a swivel type waveguide must be provided at the mast
hinge line.
2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS
Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 8, Volume V, Book Mechanical,
contains a description of the mechanical subsystem elements sufficiently detailed
for checkout requirements analysis purposes and will become the primary work-
ing document for this purpose. MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 8, Volume V, Book 6,
is incorporated into this report by reference.
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Section 3
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
As a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. As an input to the
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and
effects data will be useful in determining test priorities and test scheduling.
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system
complexity and cost.
3.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A criticality number (related to failure probability) was generated for each
major subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component
failure rate (or the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months, or
4, 380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to allow one
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals.
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component
over any six-month time period.
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers. This number,
however, should not be considered as an indication of the real risk involved, since
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem
maintainability, and the alternate operational procedures available.
Overall subsystem criticality has been determined by a computerized
optimization process whereby spares and redundancy are considered in terms of
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there-
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also
the probability that a spare or redundant component may not be available to
restore the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described
in Section 9, Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem
Design Data), Volume III (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test
Philosophy) from the MDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure
mode and criticality data are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM CRITICALITY DATA
Reliability for the Structural and Mechanical Subsystem for six months is
0. 995 and requires 75 pounds of seals and meteoroid patches to achieve. This
equates to a subsystem criticality numeric of 5 x 10- 3 for each six-month orbital
interval. This value implies that there is a 0. 5 percent risk that adequate spares
will not be available when required or that a puncture in the pressure shell will
occur that cannot be repaired. Component-level criticality numbers in Table 3-1
were estimated directly since conventional mean-time-between-failure numerics
are not appropriate for structural components.
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Based upon the baseline subsystem descriptions, each major subsystem com-
ponent was assessed to determine its most probable failure mode(s), and the
"mission effect" associated with this failure mode(s). The "mission effect" is
noted to provide a brief explanation of Space Station behavior if the particular
failure mode should occur (e. g., experiments degraded, crew hazard, etc. ).
The explanation generally does not, however, consider the offsetting effects of
backup redundancy or spares since there would be practically no effect if these
factors were considered.
In addition, the effect of failure is categorized into the following criticality
classes:
(a) Category I - Failure could cause a loss of life.
(b) Category II - Failure could cause the loss of a primary mission
objective.
(c) Category III - Failure could cause the loss of a secondary mission
objective.
(d) Category IV - Failure results in only a nuisance.
In most cases, Category II and Category III failures are not distinguishable
because primary and secondary mission objectives have not been identified to the
level of detail required to permit such separation.
Component level failure mode and criticality classification data are shown
in Table 3-2.
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Table 3-1. Structures Subsystem Criticality Ranking
Single Unit Conditioned
Component Criticality Loss Criticality Remarks
(10-6) (10-6)
Primary Structure 1, 000. 500 Considers that 1/2 the risk can be negated by
patching meteoroid penetrations, utilizing makeup
02 for leakage, and stopping meteoroids with the
meteoroid shield
Radiator 1, 000 500 Considers that 1/2 the risk can be deleted by re-
placing segments and isolating leaks
View Port Seals 500 100 Leakage can be made up by emergency 02
Tunnel Hatches 500 100 Redundant seals and more than one exit from
compartment exist
Docking Ports 360 10 Considers repair of docking ports plus capability
of docking at any port if one docking mechanism
is damaged
Main Airlock 300 10 Replaceable seals and makeup 02. EVA can also
be accomplished via forward section
Antenna Deployment 100 10 Provides for less than optimum coverage if one
Mechanism antenna is out and EVA to repair
Fairings 100 10 EVA can release
co
Table 3-2. Structure Subsystem
(A) (B) Criticality
Subsystem Failure Mission Failure No. of MTBF/Source Duty Unit
Component Mode(s) Effect Category Units Thousands Cycle (4380 hrs X
of Hours (%) B/A X 10-6)
Primary Structure Meteoroid penetra- Loss of mission I -- 100 1,000
tion objectives &
Docking collision crew safety but
Shrapnel from are secondary
pressure vessel failures
rupture
Viewport Seals Leakage Cat. I - gross II 7 --- 100 500
leakage would
require crew
evacuation of
a compartment
Tunnel Hatches Leakage Cat. I - crew I 5 --- 100 500
Jammed closed safety hazard if
Jammed open one compartment
were contamin-
ated or on fire
Docking Ports Leakage Cat. I - crew I 7 --- 100 360
Docking colli- safety if exten-
sion sive rupture
occurs requir-
ing immediate
crew evacuation
of a compartment
Table 3-2. Structure Subsystem (Continued)
Major (A) (B) Criticality
Subsystem Failure Mission Failure No. of MTBF/Source Duty Unit
Mode(s) Effect Category Units Thousands Cycle (4380 hrs X
of Hours (%) B/A X 10-6)
Antenna Deploy- Servo motor Loss of optimum III 4 --- 1 cy. 400
ment Mechanism shorts coverage
Main Airlock Leakage Loss of normal II 1 --- 100 300
Rupture EVA egress &
ingress route
Radiator Leakage Experiment loss II 1 --- 100 1, 000
Burst or curtailment
Fairings Won't separate Loss of prime II 4 --- 1 cy. 100
(Nose Cone) Hangup experiments
(Sensors) Loss of auto-
matic control
3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment. General maintenance
concepts and analyses are summarized in Section 7.
3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS
General guidelines and criteria for the definition of LRUs were established
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 3.3 were
used to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the
Space Station subsystems specific justification applicable to LRU selection for the
particular subsystem under examination was derived from the guidelines and these
justifications are presented along with the LRU listing. The "functional LRUs"
were then considered in the light of the standard electronic packaging scheme and
actual LRUs were defined and listed. The method employed and the results
achieved are discussed for both cases in the following sections.
The definition of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub-
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit
suitable for replacement. General factors considered in identifying subsystem
LRUs include: (1) maintenance concepts developed and defined in Section 3. 3;
(2) the component-level failure rates delineated in the criticality analyses of
Section 3. 1; (3) the amount of crew time and skill required for fault isolation
and repair; (4) resultant DMS hardware and software complexity; and (5) subsystem
weight, volume, location, and interchangeability characteristics. Listings of LRUs
and more specific justification for their selection follows.
Selection of LRUs for the Structures Subsystem is based primarily upon
specific failure characteristics of subsystem comments. The selection has also
been based upon a replacement level which can be accomplished with ordinary
tools and skills, and without a requirement for precision alignment and/or special
processes, environment, or facilities. The analysis has resulted in the LRU list
shown in Table 3-3.
The LRUs defined fall into the following general failure categories:
* Soft parts subject to scuffing, wear, puncture, possible age degradation,
or other surface marring. Examples include hatch seals, struts with "O"
rings, the inflatable airlock, and view port windows.
* Items subject to physical damage from outside physical impact/collision
(e. g., docking) or misuse. Examples include docking latches, the antenna
boom, the complete hatch assembly, and isotope unit handling aids.
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* Functional electromechanical units which, during the ten-year life of
the Space Station, could experience unexpected wear or internal part
failure. Examples include the despin module antirotation drive unit,
the antenna boom drive unit, the cargo handling hoist assembly, and
the electric drive unit used in handling the isotope.
Table 3-3. Structures
LRU Quantity
Docking Mechanism Shock Struts 64
Docking Port Inflatable Seals 14
Hatches and Airlock Doors Inflatable Seals 18
Inflatable Airlock 1
View Port Window Assembly 25
Hatch Temperature Indicators 32
Hatch Pressure Indicators 32
Hatch Assembly 16
Despin Module Drive Unit 1
Cable Deployment Module Drive 1
Docking Port Seal Latches 32
Antenna Boom 4
Antenna Boom Drive Unit 4
Cargo Handling Hoist 2
Cargo Hoist Cable 2
Electric Drive Unit, Isotope System Handling 2
Handling Aids, Isotope System 4
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Table 3-3.. Environmental Control and Life Support
Quantity
LRU Required RedundantRedundant
High Pressure Gas Tank 12
Flow Restrictor 30
Shutoff Valve, Solenoid W Manual OR 27
Quick Disconnect 95
3-Way Valve, Electrically Operated 34
Electric Heater 20
Pressure Regulator with Relief 2 2
Pressure Control 1 1
02 Sensor 1 1
3-Way Valve, Pressure Actuated 1 1
Shutoff Valve, Manual 275
Relief and Dump Valve 2 2
Low Pressure Tank 9
Pressure Regulator 5
Compressor 9
Heat Exchanger, Liquid to Gas 2
Check Valve 40
Air Bypass Valve 2
Fan 20
Pump 33 7
Condensing Heat Exchanger 8
Temperature Controller 7
Temperature Sensor 8
Adsorption Cannister 19
CO2 Sensor 8
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Section 4
CHECKOUT STRATEGIES
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Prior to any further requirements analysis, it is necessary to develop a
checkout strategy for all Space Station subsystems to meet the checkout objectives
of the Space Station OCS. The objectives of the Space Station OCS can be
summarized as follows:
a To increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions
* To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability
that systems will function when needed
* To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both
hardware and software
· To minimize development and operational risks
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include the following:
* OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control.
* Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized.
* The design should be modular in both hardware and software to
accommodate growth and changes.
* OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with,
other onboard hardware or software.
* The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system
responsive to changes.
* Failures should be isolated to an LRU such that the faulty unit can be
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit.
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* A caution and warning system should be provided to facilitate crew
warning and automatic "safing" where required.
* Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part or all of
the OCS test data points to the ground.
To attain these objectives via the use of an Onboard Checkout System which
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been
developed which are tailored to each Space Station subsystem.
Special emphasis has been applied to a strategy for checkout of redundant
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these functions
is integrated into the DMS is also addressed.
4. 1. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re-
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem
are identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The
functions considered are those necessary to verify operational status, detect and
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal
conditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation.
The Structures Subsystem consists of the basic Space Station structure
(shell, bulkheads, etc. ) and the associated equipment such as meteoroid shields,
hatches, air locks, docking systems, antenna booms, and artificial gravity
systems.
4. 1. 1.1 Checkout Functions
Checkout functions associated with the Structures Subsystem are relatively
few and simple. These are primarily related to the verification of compartment
integrity, hatch and docking port status, and to the deployment of the high gain
antennas and artificial gravity systems. The checkout task is characterized by
low measurement data rates, absence of special test stimulus requirements, and
by comparatively uncomplicated computation requirements.
* Stimulus Generation - No stimuli, other than normal operational control
signals, are required for checkout of the Structures Subsystem.
Operational control requirements, as tabulated in Appendix I, consist
of discrete commands for seal pressurization and similar functions.
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* Sensing - Sensing requirements of the Structures Subsystem are almost
entirely limited to measurement of mechanical parameters, such as
door, latch and actuator position and to the measurement of gas pressure
in compartments, seals, and associated tankage. These requirements
are listed in Appendix I.
* Signal Conditioning - A minimum of special signal conditioning is re-
quired since many of the measurements, particularly the position
measurements, are implemented in a manner (i. e., with limit switches)
which is directly compatible with the Data Acquisition System. Con-
ditioning may be required for the pressure transducers, depending upon
the type selected, and for the rotational sensor. Such conditioning,
where required, performs conversion and scaling of the sensor outputs
and provides a standard 0-5 Vdc output to the Data Management System.
* Limit Checking - Periodic or continuous limit checking is required for
selected pressure parameters, including seal pressures, compartment
and airlock pressures, and docking ring compression strut pressures.
* Trend Analysis - Analysis of the Structures Subsystem has revealed no
potential application of long term trend analysis techniques. Short
term analysis of compartment and seal pressures is required, however,
to verify pressure integrity and to detect and isolate meteoroid punctures
and other leaks.
4.1.1. 2 Redundant Element Checkout
Redundancy in the Structures Subsystem takes the form of installed and
independently active elements. A typical example is the dual seals on all pres-
sure hatches. These redundant elements, being fully operational rather than of a
standby nature and being independently instrumented and controlled, require no
special treatment from the checkout standpoint.
4. 1. 1. 3 Integration with Data Management Subsystem
The checkout interface between the Structures Subsystem and the DMS con-
sists of the measurement parameters listed in Appendix I of the Task 1 Final
Report. All measurements at the interface are in the form of normalized 0-5 Vdc
signals and are directly compatible with the Remote Data Acquisition Units. Test
sequencing and control are provided by the DMS, as is operational control.
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4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-1 and are those required to ensure overall
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore, test objectives are
associated with more than one subsystem.
4.2. 1 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Six checkout functions have been identified:
* Caution and warning
* Fault detection
* Trend analysis
* Operational status
* Periodic checkout
* Fault isolation
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as -
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION
* Caution and warning * Automatic tests * Localize to SS
· Fault detection · Operational * Isolate to RLU
* Trend analysis Verification
* Operational status
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General characteristics of these groups are defined below:
4.2.1.1 Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is not a test per se. It is a concept of continuously
sampling and evaluating key subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have
failed or are operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general
status of the subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated sub-
systems are indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next series of attitude con-
trol commands, an error in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. The
malfunction indication is only indicative of. an out-of-tolerance condition of an
integrated function. Final resolution of the problem to a subsystem and eventually
to LRU will require diagnostic test procedures that are separate from the con-
tinuous monitoring function.
There are situations in which the parameters being monitored are intended
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or an LRU. Examples of
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages.
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers,
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and
computation are performing properly. This evaluation will result in either a sub-
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param-
eter being monitored.
Figure 4-1 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but are differ-
ent in terms of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn-
ing function monitors parameters that are indicative of conditions critical to crew
or equipment safety. Parameters not meeting this criticality criteria are handled
as fault detection functions. Figure 4-1 shows that in the event of a critical mal-
function, automatic action is initiated to warn the crew and sequence the sub-
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems
must be evaluated to ascertain that the failure indication is not a false alarm and
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub-
systems must be evaluated to determine that proper crew safety conditions exist.
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to subsystem de-
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation-
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that are not critical, the crew
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually.
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The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac-
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the
need for unscheduled calibration. It also predicts faults and indicates the need
for diagnostic and fault isolation activities. An example of a parameter in this
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the
proper total pressure of the Space Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make-
up requirements are those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual
nitrogen flow rate is measured, and calculations are performed which make
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and
control equipment or to an excessive leak path. The historical data is not only
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues.
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate increased significantly
after the use of an airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal
leakage.
The final continuous monitor function is in operational status. This function
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with the exception of the DMS com-
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per-
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un-
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged
equipment or abnormal conditions.
4. 2. 1. 2 Periodic Testing
As opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua-
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 4-1 shows
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com-
bination of operational and automatic test approaches is employed. The actual
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub-
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose
performance characteristics are easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting
circuits, and alarm functions.
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes:
* With the subsystems in an operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos-
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions
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are being properly performed under normal interface conditions in
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance without interrupting
mission operations.
* For those situations where the integrated performance or interface
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic
procedure in a test mode. In this mode, control, reference, or bias
signals will be switched in or superimposed on the subsystems to allow
an exact determination of their performance or localization of problem
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test and operational
software to 'maintain the Space Station in a known and safe configuration.
The scheduled automatic tests are performed to verify availability or proper
configuration of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes.
* Periodic Verification of "On-Line" Subsystems - The first checkout
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable
criteria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or
pre-flight testing. The rejection criteria and subsequent decision to
repair or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to be operating properly, but
the test clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the
following alternatives must be implemented:
- If the failure mode is critical, the crew normally takes immediate
action to isolate and clear the problem.
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi-
tion degrades to an unacceptable level.
* Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated
control and switching mechanisms are operable. The acceptable/re-
jection criteria for these evaluations is identical to those for normally
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that
equipment may have known failures from previous usage or tests. This
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not
elected to perform the necessary corrective action. The checkout
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function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main-
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with
mission procedures and software to preclude activation of failed units
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair
is verified.
* Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystems'interaction and
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character-
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences.
4. 2. 1. 3 Fault Isolation
Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. As shown in Figure 4-1,
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly
related to a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola-
tion are localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or to an explicit interface between
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test necessary for LRU isolation.
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local-
ization and subroutine tests for -fault isolation, the DMS, in conjunction with the
test procedure documentation, must establish an effective man-machine interface
so that in the event of an unsolved malfunction the crew will be able to help evalu-
ate the condition and determine other test sequences necessary to isolate the
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable. of displaying
test parameters and instructions in engineering units and language and be capable
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-
ate test results to corrective action required by the crew.
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Section 5
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station
subsystems are defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and
stimulus parameters required to perform these tests. Two discrete levels of
testing are defined, i. e., continuous status monitoring tests for fault detection of
critical and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for
localization of faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to these two
levels, tests are defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units,
and parameters requiring analysis of trends are defined.
Due to the software module approach to DMS checkout, it was deemed
necessary to estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these
modules along with an assessment of the services required from an Executive
Software System to control the checkout.
These test descriptions, measurement, and stimulus information provided
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact
on the DMS software and hardware. Table 5-1 is a summary of the measurement
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station.
The Structural Subsystem forms and maintains the compartment divisions of
the Space Station. It provides a pressure shell/structural shield designed for high
damage resistance from external projectiles (meteorites), and eliminates stresses
due to orbital thermal cycling.
Ports are provided on the exterior structure shell to accommodate docking
of resupply/logistic and experiment modules which enhance orbital life and
versatility of the basic station design.
The Structures Subsystem also includes provisions needed for deployment of
the spent S-II stage as a counterweight for the artificial gravity mode of operation.
Operational assessment of the Structures Subsystem elements is generally
accomplished by monitoring of measured system parameters, and to a significant
extent, by visual inspection. Operational measurements for the subsystem are
predominantly of the event monitoring type intended to inform the crew of the
5-1
cJ1
I
STIMULUS RESPI'ONSE STATUS MIONITORING CD
SUBSYSTEM Fault
Non- Periodic Cali- Isola- (D
Analog Bilecel Digital Pulse HF Analog Bilevel Digital Total Critical Caution Warning Checkout bration Trend tion Remarks
Guidance, Navigation
and Control 20 146 62 127 1li61 70 592 130 10 516 74 74 592
Propulsion - Low Thrust 134 120 124 :178 152 14 378 48 8 :378
Propulsion - High Thrust 12i/62 287/117 12:1/(: 5:(i/242 80/28 :13/15 14/10 53i/242 259/111 117/43 482/222 Art-g/Zero-g
periods
Environmental Control/ m
Life Support 34 11t (i91 280 Ill( 129 205 :12 116(i 135 1116 172 Caution/tWarning
Signals are for a
IVA/EVA
RF Conmmunications 37 200 :l6 77 1:11 286 28 801 58 57i 24 93 801
Structures 15/16 21/19 60/53 7(5/(i 174/154 7 12:1/104 174/154
Electrical Power - TCD 52 1952 292 212 20(1 ) 708 1404 20 724 134 :1008 (1) Twelve of these
take pulse form
Electrical Power - Solar
Array/Battery 1910 4014 1928 (i780 3701 12 2184 332 6788
Data Management 53 33 188 83: 357 357 2 62 2 2 357
4512/ 5785/ :1457/ 14, :150/ 031/ 5110/ 467/ 935/ 14,260/
Total 151/169 4446 151 6 77 5(i28 :1388 201 14, 035 597 300/282 46/42 5902 319 861 14, 016
U7
I
immediate configuration/status of the subsystem. Functions to be monitored and
displayed included position/event data on docking rings, hatches and airlock doors,
and antenna booms. Analog measurements/display include counterweight position
and pressures, temperatures, and power monitoring of compartment divisions and
functional units which provide pre and post event data to the crew for condition
assessment. It should be noted that the operational data requirements for this
subsystem are extremely event-oriented and that the frequency of use is low
(ave 1/mo). Hence, the impact upon the Data Management Subsystem for real-time
continuous data display and computation is also minimal (e. g. data callup in lieu of
full-time dedication is acceptable). Measurement and stimuli requirements for the
Structures Subsystem are contained in Appendix I-6 of the Task 1 Final Report.
5.1.1 STATUS MONITORING
Due to the nature of the Structures Subsystem the requirements for continuous
status monitoring for purposes of fault detection are quite limited. Such monitoring
requirements that do exist utilize selected operational status parameters such as
temperature and pressures. Required sampling rates are relatively low and are
not critical. Acceptance rejection criteria are based upon comparison of measured
values with predetermined limits. Support from the EC/LS Subsystem monitor of
atmosphere consumption is utilized for detection of abnormal compartment leakage.
Detection of out-of-limit conditions results in notification of the crew. Since no
safety critical functions are involved, no automatic corrective action is required.
Fault isolation is accomplished by combined crew/automatic procedures. Auto-
matic fault detection is heavily supplemented by crew observation of normal sub-
system status displays and of the actual equipment during operation.
No caution/warning functions have been identified in association with the
Structures Subsystem. Certain related functions such as hull leaks are covered by
EC/LS caution/warning functions.
5.1.2 TREND ANALYSIS
No trend analysis requirements have been identified for this subsystem.
5.1.3 PERIODIC CHECKOUT AND CALIBRATION
Periodic checkout of the Structures Subsystem elements is planned to occur
either prior to a scheduled event such as module docking and artifical-g deployment/
termination or -during specific operational times such as shift changes where status
information pertaining to compartment configuration (hatch positions) and antenna
positions is of interest to the oncoming crew.
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Functional checkout of the docking mechanism, which includes visual inspec-
tion and extension/retraction of the docking ring is conducted prior to a scheduled
docking event to verify operation of the mechanism before committing the arriving
module to that port location. This checkout is scheduled sufficiently in advance to
permit reassignment of the module in the event of malfunction. Likewise, periodic
start-of-shift checks of the station configuration are planned to alert the oncoming
crew as to overall subsystem status.
Periodic review of EC/LS atmosphere consumption trend analysis is also
planned to assess leakage of the pressurized compartment(s) to establish "as is"
acceptance or need for corrective action.
5. 1. 4 FAULT ISOLATION
The fault isolation process to the LRU level for the Structures Subsystem
lacks the complexity generally associated with electronic subsystems due to the
nature of the hardware elements involved. In most instances malfunctions are
obvious from the operational data being displayed or by visual inspection, and
therefore require a minimum of DMS support. Isolation of leaks in the pressure
shell of the station will utilize a combination of pressure decay, visual inspection,
and sonic detector techniques. Pressure decay tests, accompanied by acoustical
leak sensors on the shell surface, will permit isolation to a specific compartment/
location. If the leakage occurs in association with an event such as EVA or docking
visual inspection for seal/structural damage of the hatch/door involved will be
utilized. Scuffing, wear, or puncture of a seal will be suspect. Isolation of leaks
in the basic structure shell will utilize the ultrasonic detection technique which
employs the use of portable detectors capable of sensing ultrasonic energy in the
frequency range of 35-50 KHz produced by gas flow through an orifice.
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests. The ability to test the
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and
types of interfaces. As shown in Figure 5-1, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub-
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition,
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages.
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Figure 5-1. Subsystem Interfaces
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed; (2) localize the malfunction to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicated'to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the following conditions:
* Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
· Test involves subsystem interfaces
* Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface.
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed; (2) localize the malfunction to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and- is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicatedto the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the, following conditions:
* Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
* Test involves subsystem interfaces
* Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationhip between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
careful¥-considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All special integrated tests that
have been identified are discussed in the following paragraphs. The GN&C/DMS/
PROP configuration for navigation and attitude control poses the most difficult
problem for on-orbit testing so it is presented in significant detail. Other inte-
grated tests are summarized.
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5.2.1 EC/LS - EPS ISOTOPE/BRAYTON INTERFACE
The Environmental Control/Life Support (EC/LS) Subsystem interfaces with
the EPS Isotope/Brayton System for removal of waste heat via a fluid heat ex-
changer installed in the Brayton Power Conversion System. It is planned that flow
rate, temperature, and pressure parameters be continuously monitored on both
sides of the interface as part of normal EPS and EC/LS Subsystem checks.
5.2.2 EC/LS - LOW-THRUST PROPULSION INTERFACES
The EC/LS Subsystem interfaces the low-thrust portion of the Propulsion
Subsystem to supply unreacted CO2 from the CO2 removal assembly, methane by-
products from the CO2 conversion assembly, and excess water. The Propulsion
Subsystem uses these biowaste fluids in the Low-Thrust System as propellant.
The interface is controlled by the DMS or by manual control to satisfy such para-
meters as propellant and pressurant selection. These parameters are primarily
a function of impulse requirements and available stores. Checkout of the interface
is required to verify proper valve and pump operation for the transfer of the waste
gases and excess water.
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Section 6
SOFTWARE
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The recommended software checkout startegy involves a sequence of
detecting faults, isolating faults to a failing LRU or LRUs, and reconfiguring the
system to continue operation while the failures are being repaired.
This recommendation was developed by evaluating each subsystem with
respect to the three general requirements of fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration.
Fault detection incorporates both the recognition of failure occurrence, and
the prediction of when a failure can be' expected to occur. The Remote Data
Acquisition Units (RDAUs) continually check selected test point measurements
against upper and lower limits, and notify the executive on an exception basis when
a limit is exceeded. This approach avoids occupying the central multi-processor
with the low-information task of verifying that measurements are within limits.
Trend analysis is a fault detection technique recommended for predicting the
time frame during which a failure can be anticipated. Data is acquired on a basis
of time or utilization, and compared with previous history to determine if a "trend"
toward degraded performance or impending failure can be detected.
Another checkout requirement evaluated for each subsystem is periodic
testing. This type of test is provided to exercise specific components at extended
time intervals or prior to specific events, to assure operational integrity. In the
event that a failure is detected, the periodic test will isolate to the failing Line
Replaceable Unit (LRU) and accomplish recertification after a repair operation.
Calibration of specific subsystem components will be required periodically,
or subsequent to a repair and/or replace operation. The techniques involved are
unique to the individual component; and, in some cases, require the acquisition of
operational data.
Fault isolation is required when a fault is detected. When a particular fault'
provides an indication that a life critical failure has occurred, the fault isolation
routines are automatically initiated. If the failure does not represent an immediate
danger to the vehicle occupants, the crew is notified and they will initiate the fault
isolation modules at their convenience.
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The basic requirements of the fault isolation function is to analyze the avail-
able information relevant to a problem, and identify the LRU which is responsible
for the anomaly.
Three basic approaches to meeting this requirement were considered. These
are:
* Analyze each fault as an independent problem
e Analyze each fault with a state matrix which defines the possible error
states of the subsystem
* Associate each fault with a specific subsystem, and evaluate that
subsystem in detail
The third approach was selected on a basis of software commonality and cost
effectiveness. The complexity associated with the testing can be reduced by locali-
zation of the logic associated with the analysis of the subsystem in a unique package.
The software commonality will result in reduced software development and main-
tenance costs, while increasing the reliability of the software.
The fault isolation software is structured modularly for compatibility with
the hardware structure of the subsystem. Checkout modules evaluate the per-
formance of a specific portion of the subsystem. A convenient division for this
modular structure is at the assembly level or functional area. A program module
which can determine and control the sequence in which these checkout modules are
executed is also required for each subsystem.
Subsequent to fault detection, the software associated with the subsystem
which is most likely to contain the error will be activated.
The subsystem software will analyze the error indication, and initiate a
sequence of checkout modules to isolate the problem. If successful, the crew is
notified regarding the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) to be replaced. If an error
cannot be identified, the crew is informed of the situation and has an option to
execute the periodic test of the subsystem.
After a fault has been isolated, reconfiguration software restores the
functional capability of the subsystem. This is most commonly accomplished by
exchanging a redundant element for the failing unit, or by defining an alternate
path to accomplish the required function.
The Task 2 Final Report of the basic onboard checkout techniques study
provides descriptions of the software requirements, definitions and design in
addition to detailed flow charts of specific checkout routines.
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6.2 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEM
The basic Space Station structure provides the necessary pressurized
habitat, equipment support, meteoroid protection, radiators, insulation, and
docking interfaces to meet operational requirements.
The fault detection function required for the Structures Subsystem is accom-
plished by tables which are monitored by the OCS executive program. The tables
contain the parameters which must be monitored to assure subsystem perfor-
mance. These tables are transferred to the Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU)
via the master executive program, and limit checking is accomplished. Figure 6-1
provides a graphic description of this function.
The program described by this document is required for periodic checkout
and fault isolation.
Initiation of the periodic checkout function is accomplished as the result of
a keyboard entry by a crew member. It is anticipated that periodic checkout will
be accomplished prior to a scheduled event such as docking, artificial "G" deploy-
ment, or during specific operational times such as shift changes where status
information pertaining to hatch and docking port positions are of interest to the
on-coming crew.
The fault isolation utilizes the same software modules as the periodic
checkout; however, it is anticipated that analysis of the detected error will permit
selection of the appropriate module to begin the required fault isolation.
This program meets the periodic testing and fault isolation requirements for
the Structure Subsystem.
Four specific functional areas of the subsystem require automated checkout.
They are:
* Docking Mechanisms
e Antenna Deployment Mechanisms
* Basic Structure
- Spacecraft Access
- Hatches
- Hangar
- B/I Power System Handling
e Artificial "G" Considerations
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Figure 6-1. Fault Detection Logic
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Figure 6-2 provides a block diagram of the functional areas of this subsystem.
The varied requirements of program execution are met by providing the oper-
tor with the capability to select specific options of the program.
The operation of the options of this program is depicted in Table 6-2. These
options include the capability to provide the current operational status, docking
mechanism checkout, antenna operations checkout, and to check out the provision
included for an artificial "G" environment.
6.2.1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
This section describes system constraints and requirements which have
influenced design.
6. 2. 1.1 Subsystem Definition
This program specification is based upon the subsystem definition which is
available as a result of this study contract. The test points for this subsystem are
currently defined at the assembly level; and consequently every failure which is
detected cannot be identified with a special LRU (Refer to Table 6-1).
6.2.1. 2 Docking Mechanism Checkout Module
There is no test point available to extend or retract the docking ring. The
existence of a test point labeled "Docking Ring Pressure Control" has been
assumed. This stimuli will permit extension and retraction of the docking ring.
6. 2. 1.3 Artificial "G" Checkout Module
The periodic and fault isolation test requirements indicated in the measure-
ment and stimulus list include test points labeled "Cable Deployment Drum Travel."
The information supplied by these test points can only be evaluated during an actual
deployment. Consequently, these test points have been omitted for periodic and
fault isolation testing. It is anticipated that additional test points will be identified
in the future to assure the continuity of these measurements.
There are controls provided in the system for the Operation of the S-II
latches. These latches are used to hold the S-II stage and are released during the
deployment sequence. Because of the problems that could occur if the latches
failed to relock during a test, these components are not exercised as a function of
the periodic or fault isolation test.
6-5
'1
W.
o2
cr
TIn
o
Pn
0
* DOCKING COVER
· DOCKING RING
* DOCKING SEAL
BASIC
STRUC TURE
* SPACECRAFT ACCESS * STOWED
- HANGER
- HATCHES
* B/I POWER SYSTEM
HANDLING
e MAINTENANCE
o EXTENDED
STRUCTURES
SUBSYSTEM
STUTUE I
DOC KING
MECHANISMS
ARTIFICIAL
GRAVITY
CONSIDERATIONS
ANTENNA
DEPLOYMENT
Table 6-1. LRU Identification
This table includes a list of LRU types which make up the structures subsystem.
Those which can be associated with specific test points are indicated by asterisks.
Table 3-1. LRU Identification
Cargo Handling I Hoist IIL
cargo Handling Hoist _. _ . __~ ~ ~fCargo Hoist Cable
lectric Drive Unit, Isotope System Handling
]Handling Aids, Isotope System
The checkout of the design module requires limit checking on the basis of
operational information to be acquired from the operational system. Lack of
definition regarding specific data and algorithms prevents consideration of this
requirement in the software analysis.
6. 2. 1.4 Allocable Equipment
The checkout which this program must accomplish requires that the following
components be indepently identifiable, and dedicated to this program for a specific
time interval.
Docking Ports
Hangar
Hatches
Antennas
De-spin Module
Cable Deployment Module
Line Replaceable Unit Identifiable
Docking Mechanism Shock Struts
Docking Port Inflatable Seals *
Hatches and Airlock Doors Inflatable Seals
Inflatable Airlock
Viewport Window Assembly
Hatch Temperature Indicators
Hatch Pressure Indicators
Hatch Assembly *
Despin Module Drive Unit
Cable Deployment Module Drive ,
Docking Port Seal Latches
ntenna Boom
Antenna Room Driup TT--_
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6.2.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This program specification defines specific operational requirements for
periodic testing and fault isolation of the following areas:
* Docking Mechanism
* Hatches, Airlocks, and Viewports
· Artificial Gravity Experiment Provisions
· Antenna Deployment
* Isotope Power System Handling and Replacement Equipment
The specific program modules which meet these requirements are:
· Option selection
* Operational status
* Docking mechanism checkout
* Spacecraft access module
* Antenna fault isolation
* Isotope/Brayton power handling
· Artificial "G" checkout
A module block diagram of the program is provided in Figure 6-3.
6. 2. 2. 1 Option Selection
This function processes the selection of options to permit the selective
checkout of specific functional areas. The options selected will be determined
from the parameter data supplied to the program. These options are defined in
Table 6-2. The outputs of the option selection are used by the program to select
the proper options for execution. Tutorial displays are also required.
The information processing program module processes the input parameter
information, and executes the program module specified by the options defined in
Table 6-2.
The parameter information passed to the program will be examined. If none
was included, the program will execute the programmed default option of checking
the operational status of specific test points. (Refer to paragraph 6. 2. 2. 2. )
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Table 6-2. Initial Program Options
Keyword Program Response
STATUS Execute the Operational test point status module
DOCK Execute the Docking mechanism checkout module
ANTENNA - Execute the Antenna Fault Isolation module
SPAC Execute the Spacecraft access checkout module
OPTN Display Options
IBP - Execute the Isotope/Brayton Power handling module
ATRG Execute Artificial G checkout module
Fl - Execute fault isolation routines in addition to
periodic check.
If the keyword OPTN is included in the parameter data, the program displays
the available options and waits for the operator to enter his selection.
Any combination of keywords may be entered; however, they must be
separated by a comma. The introduction of a blank character will be used to
terminate the input string.
As the keywords are identified, an associated flag is set to indicate the
function to be accomplished. The program will then examine each flag and trans-
fer control to the appropriate module for execution.
6. 2. 2. 2 Operational Status
This module is executed to provide the crew with information relating to
the current status of the docking ports, hatches, and hangar door positions.
6-10
The inputs for this function are obtained from the data base table which the
executive monitors to keep track of the status of various system components. This
information is based on data received from the following test points:
* Docking Ring Position - This test point indicates if the docking ring is
extended or retracted.
* Docking Port Cover Position - This test point indicates if the docking
port cover is open or closed.
·* 'Hatch Position Open/Close - Two measurements are required for each
hatch to determine if it is opened or closed. One test point indicates
the hatch is open, the other indicates the hatch is closed.
* Hangar Door Position Open/Close - Two measurements are required to
determine if the hangar is opened or closed. One test point indicates
an open status; the other a closed status.
The status of the test points identified in Table 6-3 are displayed on the
display console.
The information processing routine accesses the data base to determine the
positions of the docking ring, the docking port cover, the hatches, and hangar
door. This information is displayed at the console which requires execution of
the program.
Table 6-3. Operational Status Test Points
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FUNCTIONAL AREA STATUS TEST POINTS
DOCKING MECHANISM DOCKING RING POSITION
DOCKING PORT COVER POSITION
SPACECRAFT ACCESS HATCH POSITION
HANGER DOOR POSITION
6. 2. 2. 3 Docking Mechanism Checkout
The periodic and fault isolation test requirements for the docking mechanism
are identical. This routine is executed to assure the operational status of the
docking mechanism.
The primary inputs for this function consist of the subsystem test point
data.
Specific test points are:
* Docking Port Seal Pressure - The two analog pressures associated with
docking port seals are examined to assure that they are within established
limits.
* Docking Port Cover Position - This binary test point is used to deter-
mine the position of the docking port cover (open/closed).
* Docking Port Cover Control - This test point is used to command the
docking port cover to the open or closed position.
* Docking Ring Pressure Control - This test point is used to extend or
retract the docking ring.
* Docking Ring Position Extended/Retracted - There are two test points
for each docking port. One signal indicates an extended position while
the other signal indicates that the docking ring is retracted.
* Docking Ring Strut Pressure - When the docking ring is extended, this
test point is examined to determine whether the strut pressure is within
limits.
Additional inputs are received as a result of the operator's response to the
GO-NO GO options.
An output descriptive message relative to test points, which indicates an
apparent error condition, is presented on the display console. When possible,
the associated LRU is also identified.
The information processing routine uses a subroutine to check the docking
seal pressure at each docking port. The program then attempts to allocate a
docking port to prevent altering one of the mechanisms which may be functioning
in an operational status. The program then extends and retracts the docking port
ring. Each ring is left in its initial position. All position information which is
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obtained from test points is checked by comparison with the current status being
maintained in the data base. For each error that is detected, a failure is indicated
for the component, and the operator is presented with an appropriate display.
6. 2. 2.4 Spacecraft Access Control
This function is used to check the operational status of the spacecraft hatches
and hangar door, for both fault isolation and periodic testing requirements.
The inputs for this function consist of the subsystem test point data. Specific
test points are:
* Hangar Door Position Open/Close - There are two points for the hangar
door. One indicates the open position; the other a closed status.
* Hangar Door Control - This, stimuli is used to open and close the hangar
door.
* Hangar Pressure - There are two stimuli points for the measurement of
the pressure inside the hangar.
* Hangar Temperature - There are two analog points available to measure
the temperature inside the hangar.
* Hatch Position Open/Close - There are two stimuli for each of the 16
hatches. One signal indicates the open position; while the other indicates
the closed position.
An output descriptive message relative to test points which indicate an appar-
ent error condition are presented on the display console. When possible, the
associated LRU is also identified.
In order to efficiently achieve the requirements for both periodic testing and
fault isolation for the spacecraft access components, the two were combined into
one module and execution is at the operator's option.
The program assures that both test points which provide hangar door positions
are in agreement with each other, and with the status being maintained by the DMS.
If disagreement is detected, the operator is provided with an appropriate display.
When the points and status are in agreement, the hangar door is moved through
both the open and closed positions; and the test points and DMS are again examined
for consistency. The operator is notified by a display if the door fails to operate,
or the positional indicators provide conflicting information.
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Subsequent to verifying the hangar door operation if the fault isolation option
has been selected, the temperature and pressure in the hangar are limit checked.
In the event of a failure, the hangar is configured non-operational and the operator
is notified by a display.
The test points which indicate hatch positions are compared against each
other and with the DMS status to assure compatibility. In the event of a dis-
crepancy, the hatch will be configured non-operational and the operator is notified
by a display.
For each error that is detected, a failure is indicated for the component;
and the operator is presented with the appropriate display.
6. 2. 2. 5 Antenna Fault Isolation
The program requires the capacity to analyze the antenna system for purposes
of fault isolation.
The inputs for this function consist of the subsystem test point data. Specific
test points are:
* Boom Position - This point is used to determine if the antenna is stowed,
extended, or retracted for maintenance.
* Launch Storage Position Lock Status - This test point is used to deter-
mine the lock position when the antenna is stowed.
* Antenna Launch Stowage Lock Control - This test point is used to assure
that the stowage lock can be locked and unlocked to permit deployment
of the antenna.
* Boom Deployment Position Lock Status - This test point is used to
determine the boom lock status when the boom is extended.
* Boom Deployment Lock Control - This test point is used to assure that
the boom locks can be locked and unlocked when the boom is extended.
* Boom Maintenance Position Lock Status - This test point is used to
determine the boom lock status when the boom is in the maintenance
position.
* Boom Maintenance Position Lock Control - This test point is used to
lock and unlock the boom while it is in a maintenance position.
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· Drive Unit Power Monitor - This test point is used to be sure that the
power monitor is operating within limits.
* Drive Unit Control - This test point is used to issue a test level to the
drive unit power monitor, which is then limit checked.
An output descriptive message relative to test points which indicate an
apparent error condition are presented on the display console. When possible,
the associated LRU is also identified.
The information processing program module performs fault isolation for
each antenna. The boom position is read from the specified test point and com-
pared with the current position being maintained by the Data Management System,
to insure compatibility. The antenna is in a stowed, extended, or maintenance
position. The lock, which is associated with that position, is then checked and
again compared with the Data Management System's records for it. If everything
is in agreement, the lock is unlocked and relocked to be sure of its operational
capacity.
Any discrepancy between positions or failure to lock or unlock results in a
message being provided to the operator.
The drive unit power monitor is then limit checked as the final part of this
module operation.
For each error which is detected, a failure is indicated for the component;
and the operator is presented with the appropriate display.
6. 2. 2.6 Isotope/Brayton Power Handling Module
This program module is required to check the Isotope/Brayton power
supply for purposes of fault isolation. The inputs for this function are the test
point values for the power. A descriptive message relative to the power test
point is presented on the display console when an error is indicated. The
information processing module performs fault isolation by limit checking the
drive unit power monitor for the Isotope/Brayton power supply.
6. 2. 2. 7 Artificial "G" Checkout Module
This program module is used to check out the considerations in the structures
for the artificial "G" environment. It is anticipated that it will be executed prior
to both spin up and spin down activities.
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The inputs for this function consist of the subsystem test point data. Specific
test points are:
* Spoke Pressure Supply - This test point is used to assure that the
pressure supply for the spoke is within limits.
* Spoke Internal Pressure - This test point is used to assure that the
internal pressure within the spoke is within limits.
* De-spin Module Rotation Control - This test point is used to place the
de-spin module in rotation.
* De-spin Module Rate - This test point is used to measure the rate of
the de-spin module's rotation.
* De-spin Module Power - This test point is used to assure that the power
being supplied to the de-spiin module is within limits.
* S-II Stage Latches Latched/Unlatched - Two test points are used to
ascertain the status of the S-II stage latches.
* Cable Deployment Module Strut Ring Position - This test point is used
to determine the strut position. In a zero "G" environment, it should
be retracted. In an artificial "G" environment, it should be extended.
* Cable Deployment Module Power Monitor - This test point is examined
to be sure that the module power monitor is within limits.
An output descriptive message relative to test points, which indicate an
apparent error condition, is presented on the display console. When possible, the
associated LRU is also identified.
The information processing program module is used to accomplish periodic
checkout and fault isolation of those components associated with the artificial "G"
environment. The internal pressure supply for the spoke and the internal pressure
in the spoke are tolerance checked to assure the habitability for the crew in the
spoke. The program then limit checks the power to the de-spin module to assure
it is within limits. A de-spin module rotational command is issued to the de-spin
module. This command is based upon access to operational data which provides
the spin rate of the space station. Using this data, rates are computed which the
module is expected to attain. The de-spin module rate is evaluated at one second
intervals for a sample period and compared to the precalculated limits.
Status checks are then made on the cable deployment module. The S-II latch
positions are status checked; and in the event of a positional discrepancy, the dis-
play reflecting the S-II latch positions is presented. The strut position is then
status checked to assure that it is in the proper position for the current environment.
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6. 2. 2. 8 Termination Routine
This module is included to assure the orderly return of control to the
executive at the completion of execution.
The inputs to this module indicate a successful or unsuccessful completion
of program execution. In the event termination is required due to operator inter-
vention, or a detected failure, additional inputs as to the status of the associated
components are required.
information processing must accomplish the functions required to assure the
subsystem is properly configured before control is returned to the executive.
Upon entry, this module determines if the program has been terminated as a
result of operator intervention or successful completion of the test.
In the event of operator intervention, the bookkeeping required to assure that
the subsystem is properly configured must be accomplished.
A message indicating completion of execution is presented, and control is
returned to the executive.
6.2.3 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
This program requires interface with the master executive, OCS executive,
and the structure subsystem hardware.
The interface between the Structure Subsystem checkout program and the
executive architecture is shown in Table 6-4.
Detailed interfaces which are required in the executive architecture to
service this program are defined in paragraph 3. 2. 2 of Appendix A of the Task 2
Final Report.
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Table 6-4. Structures Checkout Program and Executive Program
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Section 7
MAINTENANCE
There are two aspects of maintenance which entered into the basic study.
Basic maintenance concepts were provided as part of the baseline resulting from
the Phase B Space Station study; they are discussed in subsection 7. 1 below.
Additionally, one of the study tasks was aimed at implementation of an onboard
electronics maintenance capability. The results of that task are summarized
in subsection 7. 2.
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
7.1.1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub-
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, or
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates
of mean-time-between-failure, or accident/failure probability, are not accepted
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance.
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical to do so.
As a design objective, no routine or planned maintenance shall require use
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment are impractical, remote control
means of affecting such maintenance or repairs should be examined. However,
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable,
such as maintenance of external equipment.
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar
as it is reasonable and practical to do so. This includes all program aspects of
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time
cannot be eliminated as a factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con-
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried
action.
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7.1.2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support
facilities provided on the Space Station include:
* Special tools for mission-survival contingency repairs such as soldering,
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance
analyses, although repairs of this type are not considered routine main-
tenance methods.
* Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc. ).
* Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair activities.
* Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update
data, and procedures not carried onboard.
* Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible
with the level at which this capability is found to be required.
* Maintenance support stockrooms or stowage facilities for spares
located in an area that provides for ease of inventory control and
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages.
7.1.3 SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace-
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an
effective onboard repair capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life
is not feasible. The need for a repair capability, in turn, requires that a mal-
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a
separate, but interdependent, part of the Onboard Checkout Study.
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Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina-
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs.
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for
the Space Station are:
* It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA
may be used to accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution
is reasonable.
* Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the
repair is the LRU.
* A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost
essential functions beyond the planned spares level) or for development
purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in the form
of standard measurement capabilities which are used primarily to
reduce the amount of special test equipment required.
* Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at
failure or wearout. Limited-life items that fail with time in a manner
that can be defined by analysis and test will be allowed to operate until
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or
repair exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable
items (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis.
7.2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (STUDY TASK 3)
The objective of this task was to generate recommendations of supporting
research and technology activities leading to implementation of a manned electron-
ics maintenance facility for the Space Station. Early in the task it became apparent
that attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was neces-
sary to refocus the task to address implementation of an on-board maintenance
capability encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities.
The critical questions are the following:
* What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations?
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e What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)?
7.2.1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 7-1.
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with an
operable one from spares storage.
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified.as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable,
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRU is then
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed
in spares storage.
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle.
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance for
any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 10
years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing such
a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized below. The analyses leading to them are explained in the Task 3 Final
Report.
* Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have empha-
sized justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and
tools for space application and human factors criteria. Much less
attention has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or
definition of shop level maintenance requirements.
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Figure 7-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle
* The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis,
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be
achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabili-
ties are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can
probably be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stim-
ulus and measurement provisions.
* Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including
participation in fault isolation) is estimated to average 7. 2 manhours per
week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive to
equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed.
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS).
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* The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. Onboard
spares should be LRUs.
* For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be
SRAs.
* The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space
Base.
* The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central
maintenance/repair bench.
· Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future perfor-
mance, as part of a system study/design program or as separate
supporting research and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with
(1) development of a portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/
test bench with special provisions for small parts retention and for de-
bris collection, (3) design for accessibility of test points and subassem-
blies, and (4) devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station.
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the
33-foot diameter, four-deck configuration.
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates,
derived wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive
to small variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment fail-
ure rates, which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to
pursue all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study
has generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful
visibility of the path to implementation of that capability.
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